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Interviewee:  ONG KENG YONG 
Interviewer:  Sabrina Chua 
Date:   11 January 2016 
Location:  Singapore 
 
 
0:00:19 
Sabrina Chua 
 
Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, thank you very much for speaking with the Institute 
for Societal Leadership. We're going to start with your career in MFA (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), because the bulk of your career has been in the Foreign Service 
so... if you don't mind me asking, why did you decide to go to, into the Foreign 
Service? 
 
0:00:37  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
When I was in law school at the then University of Singapore, there were 147 of 
us. It is, until today, one of the largest groups of law graduates. So, halfway 
through law school, I was asked to attend a career talk by some guys from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore. I was quite impressed. So, from third 
year onwards in law school, I decided to look at international issues. 
 
I realised that the Foreign Service, as they call it, utilises a lot of the analytical 
training that we do in law school. The gift of the gab is also valued in the Foreign 
Service in dealing with foreign diplomats, and other countries around the world. 
I said, “If I feel that I should look at a non-legal career, MFA would be a good 
choice.” Actually the other push factor is really that... looking at 147 of us, it 
would be very competitive. Deep in my heart, I had this issue of how to go and 
fight with my own classmates. I was sort of the class monitor for all the four 
years in the law school. I got quite fond of all my classmates, and my challenge 
was, if I had to fight with another classmate for one job in a law firm, most likely, 
I would just give it to the person.  
 
0:02:29  
Sabrina Chua 
 
So, you're a softie at heart? 
 
0:02:31  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
Yes, I think so, that's what my wife says. It was also quite lucky that year, when I 
came out after graduation, I applied for a job in the Foreign Ministry. I also 
applied for a job in Singapore Airlines, and I applied for a job in one of the law 
firms. When I opened the letterbox, it was the same day I got all three replies 
and... it was all acceptance. Then I did a very Singaporean thing: how much are 
they paying me? Ministry of Foreign Affairs was paying me the most, because it 
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took into account my National Service years.  I said to my wife, then my 
girlfriend, “Maybe this is where I should go.” I try for three, four years, and if I 
don't like it, I will come back and join the legal service, legal practice. That's how 
I got into Foreign Ministry.  
 
0:03:31  
Sabrina Chua 
 
So, you enjoyed it? 
 
0:03:32  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
Yes! But I also tell you, the Foreign Minister at that time was S. Rajaratnam. The 
Foreign Secretary, Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs, was SR Nathan.  He did a 
very clever thing, which I feel until today, had a strong impact on my life, and the 
rest of my cohort. He decided that we should develop what he called “area 
speciality”. There can be Arab study specialists, there can be Southeast Asian 
study specialists, there can be Chinese study specialists, and so on so forth.  He 
basically assessed all of us, and more than three quarters of us were put on this 
“Area Specialisation Programme”. What he did was, two or three of us could go 
out in one year to do our master's degree, specialising in the designated area of 
studies. 
 
0:04:29  
Sabrina Chua 
 
Did you have a choice in picking your specialisation? 
 
0:04:31  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
I did not have a choice because they offered me to do Arab studies, and when I 
looked at it, I said, “Why me on Arab studies?” They said, “You passed this test 
that we did on language identification, and in spite of all the strange sounds from 
the Arabic language, you came out on top of it. So, I looked at the scenario, at that 
point in time there was no one in Arab studies or interested in the Middle East. 
Therefore, I said, "Let's do it. I ended up in Georgetown University doing my 
master's degree on Arab studies for two years.  
 
I crammed three years of Arabic study in the two years of master's degree at 
Georgetown University.  It was quite tough, first year in particular. But by the 
end of my first academic year, I got the hang of it. I went along quite okay. The 
main problem of course, was the Arabic language, which to us non-speakers, it's 
a completely different world. At that point in time, to pass the exam, and we were 
tested by the people from the US State Department, not from the university. We 
had to pass a level of competency required of the American diplomats. I guess 
what you call it? You crammed and passed your exam. That's how we struggled 
through. My wife was with me at the time, and we really had to work very hard.  
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0:6:21  
Sabrina Chua 
 
You mentioned that one of the influential factors in your career was S. 
Rajaratnam and SR Nathan, how was it like working for them? 
 
0:06:31  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
For Mr Rajaratnam it was very straightforward. He had some ideas. He threw it 
at you, you should grasp it quickly, and go with him, with the flow. He was very 
learned.  He read a lot. He had very passionate ideas about the world at that time. 
He was very anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Union in his own ways. He would do 
most of his own reading. He’d craft his own speech most of the time. But as a 
Foreign Minister, you have to deal with foreign visitors. Therefore, you are 
required to take note of whatever transpired during the meeting, and to be 
accurate, in a certain way, also very concise.  You do this on your own, because 
he will not be bothered to read the record that you filed. We had to write it out 
clearly, succinctly, and pass it to our immediate supervisor, who would normally 
not be there in the meeting. You had to be very alert, and follow the discussion, 
and be accurate.  If you come across anything that you are not familiar, you 
should go and ask the respective Desk Officer in the Ministry. “Hey, the Minister 
talked about Bosnia Herzegovina, what is it all about?” You get some ideas, and 
then you try to compare the notes that you recorded, to see whether it makes 
sense to put it together in a paragraph. It was very good training as far as I 
remember, because Mr Rajaratnam did not bother to look at his notes of 
conversation, or recordings of all this interaction. He just assumed you are 
competent, you will write well, and you document it for the sake of the 
bureaucracy, the ministry record.  
 
0:08:44  
Sabrina Chua 
 
That's something you appreciated? 
 
0:8:46  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
Yes. I think we very often... because he was such a globalist, he looked at 
everything with the international dimension. He had always the strategic angle, 
so you learn a lot listening to him talking to the foreign dignitaries. When we 
travelled with him, he was the easiest of bosses to look after. He would just do 
the protocol thing as we require him to do.  The rest of the time he would be 
sitting down writing his own diary, and what not. So, from very early in my time 
at the Foreign Ministry, I learnt to be self-reliant, to be precise, to be accurate.  
 
On top of that, we have Permanent Secretary SR Nathan, who was very sharp, 
and had what we call “elephant memory”. He could remember everything he 
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asked you.  We shy away from seeing him along the corridor, because whenever 
he catches you anywhere in the building, he will say, “Keng Yong, do this for me. I 
read something the other day, what was it about?” Then, we had to go and follow 
up on this.  He was very instrumental in keeping all of us on the ball, so to speak. 
As I have mentioned earlier, he was very concerned about the 
institutionalisation of the Foreign Ministry. So he developed this concept of “area 
specialisation”. At the same time, when we were asked to do this, he would give 
us what we call ECA, extra-curricular activities. So, my job in the beginning was 
to focus on the Middle East, and the Third World countries, and eventually I went 
to do Arab studies. But my extra reading--I'm the resource person for nuclear 
and disarmament issues--I always felt afraid to go to Mr Nathan.  He would say, 
“Now tell me, what's this technical term in the disarmament document...?” Most 
of that area happened in Vienna, and at the UN (United Nations), so unwittingly, 
we also had to read a lot about UN work, and what not. That's how he trained the 
Foreign Service Officer. He was fussy about our recording, our writing. He would 
like to give us specialised training, and once you are given that speciality, you 
should be familiar with all that, and you are the resource person for the ministry 
for that area. Then thirdly, he would make sure that you are not boxed in into 
one subject, or one technical area. He gives you extra-curricular activity to do.  
 
After a while, it became a challenge to keep up with it, because he would make 
you stay on your toes by asking you a question, or pose a comment for you to 
follow up whenever he sees you in the Ministry, or when he reads something, 
and he would write down a short note for you, or the so-called resource person 
to go and find an explanation to him as to why people said this, or what is this 
concept is about. So that way, we got a very broad multi-faceted training.  
 
0:12:32  
Sabrina Chua 
 
What about Singapore's role in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
or strategic position when ASEAN was founded? What was its strategic position, 
and has it changed since? 
 
0:12:44  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
The wonderful thing about Singapore diplomacy is that we are very consistent. 
We have got very good foundation. When we got into ASEAN, we know that 
ASEAN has certain limitations, but ASEAN can serve Singapore’s interest in 
certain other ways. We have never, up till today, got carried away by the highs, 
or the lows of ASEAN.  To put it differently, we are realistic about ASEAN, where 
it can help us, we would go full stream, full steam. But we know the extent in 
which the ASEAN vehicle can serve our interests. 
 
The ASEAN mechanism helps us to overcome the small size of Singapore. At 
certain times, it also enables us to do more than what we alone can do. The 
selling point about ASEAN to many of the ASEAN audiences out there has always 
been that working as ten ASEAN members is better than working individually, or 
 5 
small group of two, or three countries. ASEAN has helped us in two ways. One, 
we are now a big trading country. In fact, Singapore has always been in the top 
twenty of the world trading countries. So how do we keep the market open? How 
do we get other countries, which may be too inward looking, to be more open to 
trade, and other flow of investments, and skilled personnel? Through ASEAN, we 
were able to articulate the benefit, and the advantages of keeping free trade, free 
market. 
 
0:15:00  
Sabrina Chua 
 
So, does the AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) help? 
 
0:15:02  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
It does help. People forget that the AEC originated from one period in history, 
which was very threatening to our own survival. This was in the year 1997, 
1999, we had the 1997, 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the Tom Yam Crisis as we 
call it, because of the collapse of the baht, and other currencies in the region. As a 
result of that, people in the capital rich countries were wary about Southeast 
Asia.  Foreign direct investment declined, and as a result of the lousy economic 
condition, people started to look at all the bad things about Southeast Asia and 
put those bad things on top. What the ASEAN ministers did was to rally together, 
and we did quite a few things, including engaging big American consultancies, 
like McKinsey & Company, to do competitiveness study, to do things that will 
help refocus the investors’ interest in Southeast Asia. AEC came from there, 
because when we studied the competitiveness of ASEAN, at that time, much of 
the FDI (Foreign direct investment) was being diverted to China, to even India, 
and at one point, to even Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, and all that, 
because when you think about producing consumer goods, you go to those 
countries with the certain advantages. After the Tom Yam Crisis, as we call it, 
those guys with money will go to all these places. We need to bring people back 
into Southeast Asia.  Using the ASEAN vehicle, we were able to persuade 
investors to take a second look at Southeast Asia, with the size of the market, and 
the potential of the middle class, and what not.  Overall this ASEAN was the basis 
to construct an AEC, ASEAN Economic Community. Without ASEAN, how can we 
construct an AEC?   
 
The problem I think is that our ASEAN leadership did not spend enough time 
articulating the difference between an ASEAN Economic Community, and the 
European Union. At that time, they were called the European Economic 
Community. People minimise this issue of supra-nationality in Europe, because 
they think that by integrating all the European economies, and not playing up on 
nationalism, Europe can grow much faster. But in the case of Southeast Asia, we 
were all very young countries, and you tell people to pool together their 
sovereignty advantages. People will look at you with aghast and unaccepting 
looks, because we all want to be our own country, and look after our own 
national interest. So, the leaders could have done more to explain that what 
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ASEAN was doing is to form a community, which pooled together our strength, 
developed regional initiatives, which will help our own national development, 
our own national reforms. We don't have a thing called the European 
Commission, that imposes specific supra-national policy, which everybody must 
follow regardless of whether you are capable or not. We still rely on regional 
ideas, and then leave it to the national authority to follow up. We are actually just 
using some of this community idea from Europe to help us facilitate the ASEAN 
Ten coming together. We are still very much an inter-governmental body. We are 
not a supra-national body.  
 
Given the fact that we were all young nation states, the ability for all ten of us to 
come together in this manner actually is a significant achievement. We still have 
suspicion and mistrust of one another, but when we have a regional challenge, 
something that will hit all of us, like for example, at that time the financial crisis, 
we all come together and work together.  
 
Now these days we have South China Sea, ASEAN may be maligned by all these 
ineffective statements, and what not.  The fact is that we still stay together.  To 
the other side, the Chinese diplomacy, they look at us as ASEAN. They try their 
best to divide and rule, but still more or less, we stay together as ASEAN. For the 
Americans, for the Japanese, for the Australians, and Indians, they see us as 
ASEAN. They believe that it's useful to continue to engage us, do things with us. 
Hopefully, we can be a bulwark against the Chinese expansion, but they also 
know that we don't want to take sides. So overall, the net result is active 
engagement of our Southeast Asian countries. Where there is an advantage for 
Southeast Asia to grow with, say India, or with Japan, we ride on it. Then, we 
have the US (United States) still engaged in this region, and much as we don't like 
to say so in public, all of us in ASEAN believe that this idea of balance of power in 
Southeast Asia is actually a doable and a good concept for ASEAN's future. Of 
course, Indonesia, as the biggest country in ASEAN and, very committed to non-
aligned, would like to think that non-alignment is still the best way to go. But in 
reality, that may be something more difficult to achieve. So overall, ASEAN has 
given us a platform to practice all this thing called balance of power, avoiding 
taking sides, engaging all the major powers, in a more or less manageable 
manner. As we do all this, the Western investors, the big companies would say, 
“We can still go to Southeast Asia to do business. After all, they have got such a 
big market. If the ASEAN country knows how to deal with all these challenges 
facing them, with regard to the relationship with the big powers, we can go.” 
That's where we are today.  
 
It's very unfortunate that people don't look at this in the historical context, in the 
bigger picture. They just assume that it's a given. Big country will come here to 
look for friends. Big company will come here to look for business opportunity. 
It's all a big sales pitch if you'd like. With ASEAN, we have a very wonderful thing. 
In today's language it's a USP, Unique Selling Proposition. Without ASEAN, why 
would the big company come? You can say we have oil and gas, but so what? Oil 
and gas are much easier to buy and do in Middle East, and in Russia, why should 
I come to Southeast Asia? We have 600 over million people. I can go to some 
other places like India, or China.  Why I need to pay attention to Southeast Asia? 
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But we say, “No, you are passing through our sea lanes of communication. 
Trading is done extensively between the East and West, and you need shipping 
to go through, you need airline to go through. So here we are, we give you good 
predictability. When it's necessary we talk about the connectivity, and when it's 
really hard-pressed, we talk about the rule of law.” All these things help to bring 
people to Southeast Asia, and the progress that we achieved today, in terms of 
general prosperity, in terms of Southeast Asia being in the mind-set of people 
around the world.  
 
0:24:09  
Sabrina Chua 
 
What is the secret to ASEAN staying together, because like you said, historically 
there have been regional differences and conflicts? 
 
0:24:16  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
The secret, really, is that all of us in our respective countries, know that by 
ourselves we cannot manage this big portfolio of transactions. To put it in very 
business-oriented terms, it is such a big business managing Southeast Asia. So, 
how do we deal with it? Using one bank to manage this big portfolio of 
investment, or this equity? Not possible. So, we have different bankers to help us, 
and where possible, we tell our bankers to converge their resources, to help us 
manage this big amount of transactions.  
 
Maybe I should say also that, at the end of the day, Southeast Asian leaders 
quibble with one another. Southeast Asian nations, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, nag at each other, look at each other with envy from time to time, get 
mad with one another. But all the leaders so far, at least from my close 
observation in five years as Secretary General of ASEAN, they finally come to one 
basic point, which is that: strategically, we must engage each other, and hang out 
together. Because if we don't hang on together, we will be hung by whatever 
lousy transaction out there, lousy turn of events out there, and be played out by 
all the other big boys, in their own respective great games and diplomatic 
manoeuvres. The good thing about Southeast Asia, or about ASEAN, is that 
ultimately, we have a certain quality of leadership. Not many people know about 
this, not many people talk about this, but I think history will show that generally 
speaking as a region, the quality of our leaders is not bad. You may have idiotic 
people in some of the ASEAN countries, but when they come together, and they 
sit together as ASEAN leaders in a summit--as Secretary-General, I sit in five 
years of this kind of things--they talk to each other very sensibly, and as 
politicians. They all are political leaders, they're not the Sergeant Major from the 
army, who become President of a country by a coup d'état. They are all very 
clever. 
 
0:26:54  
Sabrina Chua 
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There were some... 
 
0:26:55  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
Yes, but even in those kinds of context, they quickly learn the trick of the trade, 
by the socialisation as ASEAN Ten. I used to remember the Vietnamese, and the 
Laotian leaders. They talked very little in ASEAN meetings, but by the time I left 
after five years, the Vietnamese Prime Minister was very confident, the Laotian 
Prime Minister was more talkative, because every time they come for ASEAN 
Summit, there is the rigmarole of protocol, meeting, speeches. The ASEAN way:   
either we play golf, or we sing karaoke. You basically socialise these guys to a 
diplomatic quality, that make them feel more and more confident of themselves. 
This element has not been thoroughly studied, but when I discussed it with my 
predecessor as Secretary General, and my successor as Secretary General, we feel 
that this is a very important dimension of ASEAN, that people don't really attach 
enough importance and value. 
 
0:28:11  
Sabrina Chua 
 
So, the ASEAN way is more a boon than a bane?  
 
0:28:14  
Ong Keng Yong 
 
Yes definitely. It cannot be said to be exactly one way, or the other but overall, it 
helps. When we say there is non-interference, we go back to this basic concept. 
You run your own household, you run your own house decor, you do things in 
your own garden. Your neighbour next door, if you live in a semi-detached house, 
would have a lot of say, but still he cannot go and tell you, “I don't like the way 
you cultivate your garden, or I don't like the way you arrange your furniture in 
your living room.” He can contribute ideas, and you say, “Okay, seems a good 
idea.”  But your neighbour cannot come and tell you, “Rearrange this!” 
 
The other thing that I always put across is that people make a big deal about 
ASEAN having this non-intervention policy, but is that so unique to ASEAN, to 
Southeast Asia? Everywhere around the world they do that. Even in today's 
Europe. The Spanish don't like the way the French tell them what to do at the 
border, vice versa. So, that is not unique, and people make a big deal out of this, 
because they think that this seems to be one punch line they can deliver against 
ASEAN.  
 
Secondly, when you look through, what we are doing in ASEAN is this, when we 
say we have this non-interference, non-intervention principle, it's not correct to 
say we are so precise. We have through the years started to refine our own rule 
about this. We may not tell you how to rearrange the furniture in your living 
room, but you, after a while say, “I'm getting stale of this. Maybe I ask my 
neighbour what do you do?” So, from 2004, 2005, the Indonesian authority 
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started to talk about Aceh, and then the Independent Movement of Aceh, and 
brief the ASEAN leaders from the other countries about what is happening in 
Aceh. As a result of that, the Filipinos started to talk about southern Mindanao to 
the other ASEAN leaders, and explain why it is such an intractable problem: the 
Muslims and the Christian relationship in southern Philippines.  In 2006, 
Thaksin, before he was deposed, decided to say, “Since all of you are prepared to 
talk a little bit about your own domestic issues, I want to tell you why I'm not 
happy with you talking about southern Thailand. But now, I understand that  
your starting point on this issue is here, in this manner. Let me explain to you my 
position. Overtime, you notice that the respective countries with all this kind of 
tricky, intractable issues, have started to share their respective approaches, and 
their respective concerns, with the other countries.  
 
This is how we think in ASEAN, we overcame the isolation of Myanmar. We had a 
hard time with the rest of the world, but because of the ASEAN socialisation at 
the leadership level I talked about just now, and because of our constant harping 
on the need to look at our own house, and how can we as responsible members, 
help each other. I believe that the Myanmar leadership could see for themselves 
the ability for them to continue the way they are, or the way they were.  As I 
explained to my Western scholar friends, I say that we cannot claim credit for 
what happened in Myanmar, but we definitely can claim credit for being able to 
stand up to the demand of the world to force the Myanmar guy to change 
overnight. Maybe if we had done that, there might be a different situation now in 
Myanmar. We never know, because we are tinkering with seventeen, eighteen, 
twenty different communities. Until today, they haven't even sorted it out.  
 
So final point is that: ASEAN is quite unique. We have done it in the organic way, 
in my opinion, typically Southeast Asian. We have taken in the extraneous issues, 
the external ideas, and we try to cook it in a manner that we can have a nice 
delicious dish. It may not be the end of our problem, but at least what we can say 
to each other is that: we have overcome a lot of difficulty together, and we should 
not easily give up in the face of new challenges that we have. Today, we have to 
deal with issues like terrorism, religion and radicalisation of groups within our 
own society, because we are so multi-cultural, multi-religious. But if we look at 
how we had tackled some of these previous difficult political and geopolitical 
issues, I think we have a certain way. It is not the only formula, but we can at 
least minimise the potential for a dramatic outbreak of violence, or war between 
the states. 
 
0:34:21  
Sabrina Chua 
 
Thank you very much, sir, for speaking with us.  
 
0:34:24 
Ong Keng Yong 
 
Thank you very much, Sabrina.  
 
